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INTRODUCTION
Imagine this: You are an attorney who specializes in disability or employ-
ment discrimination law. A woman comes to you with a potential claim. She
is a police officer who has a mild form of multiple sclerosis ("MS"). The
department where she works has learned of her MS and believes it limits her
ability to work. In fact her MS is rather mild, and it does not interfere with her
work at all. Some of the other police officers on the force have heard about her
MS, and they refuse to work with her because they fear she will not be a relia-
ble partner. The police department has fired her. Applying the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)' to these facts, what should you advise this client?
Does the ADA protect her because her employer regarded her as disabled?2
In fact, the ability to bring a claim for failure to accommodate depends not
on a clear and simple application of the law, but rather it depends on geogra-
phy.3 The United States Courts of Appeals are split, and the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari three times on the issue of whether, as a matter of law,
there is a duty under the ADA to accommodate a person regarded as disabled.4
Although the ADA clearly provides protection for the person "regarded as"
disabled,5 it is far from clear what the nature of this protection is.
This Note asserts that, as a matter of law, there should be a duty to accom-
modate the person "regarded as" disabled under the ADA. This Note first
looks at the roots of the ADA, considering the predecessor Rehabilitation Act
as well as the legislative history of the ADA itself. Next, this Note examines
the cases comprising the current split among the United States Courts of
* William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D. candidate, May 2007; M.S.W., University of
Houston, 2000; Ph.D., University of Texas, 1984; B.A., University of Texas, 1974. The
author thanks Professor Ann C. McGinley for her instructive comments on an earlier version
of this Note. The author also thanks Kevin P. Bundy for his comments and suggestions
concerning this topic. Finally the author thanks the Hon. Procter Hug, Jr., for whom she
externed. It was during this externship that the author first encountered this legal issue.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2 This problem is based on a hypothetical presented in Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.
Supp. 2d 151, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
3 Philip M. Berkowitz, Geography Rules Unsettled Questions, 234 N.Y.L.J. 5, 5 (Sept. 8,
2005).
1 See Figure 1, infra.
5 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (2000).
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Appeal and the reasoning of these courts. The Note concludes by recom-
mending that courts utilize other features inherent to the ADA - namely the
reasonableness requirement and undue hardship defense - to protect against
possible "bizarre" results from enforcing a duty to accommodate for the
"regarded as" plaintiff. Finally, the Note also briefly discusses alternative theo-
ries under which a "regarded as" plaintiff may seek relief.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE "REGARDED As" DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 - The Roots of the ADA
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990,
acknowledging that Civil Rights legislation had not addressed persons with dis-
abilities and that segregation and discrimination based on disability still
existed.6 The ADA recognized that discrimination and prejudice prevented
otherwise capable persons from participating fully in work and life,7 and the
Act intended to serve as "a national mandate for the elimination of discrimina-
tion against persons with disabilities."8
The ADA followed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibited dis-
crimination on the basis of disability.9 Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act
applies to federal agencies and the United States Postal Service;' 0 and Section
504 applies to programs that receive federal funding.1 1 The ADA extended the
prohibition on disability-based discrimination broadly into the private sector.12
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment; 3 Title II prohibits
discrimination in public services;14 and Title III prohibits discrimination in
public accommodation. 5
Both acts rely on the premise that social attitudes can be just as disabling
as medical impairments themselves. When Congress initially considered the
proposed Rehabilitation Act, testimony in both chambers of Congress sup-
ported the notion that negative stereotypes combine with disabilities to result in
even greater social handicaps. Congressman Charles Vanik, arguing to the
House of Representatives for extending civil rights protections to disabilities,
told of a boy with cerebral palsy whom his school excluded from the classroom
because his teacher said his appearance nauseated his classmates - even though
the boy was competent academically and posed no physical threat. 6 Senator
Walter Mondale similarly related the story of a woman with serious arthritis
6 President George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (July 26, 1990), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1990/900726
00.html [hereinafter Pres. G. H. W. Bush].
7 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (2000).
8 Id. § 12101(b)(1).
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
10 Id. § 791.
I Id. § 794.
12 RUTH COLKER ET AL., THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 32 (4th ed. 2003).
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
14 Id. §§ 12131-12165.
15 Id. §§ 12181-12189.
16 117 CONG. REc. 45,974 (1971).
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who was denied a job on a college campus because the school trustees thought
"normal students shouldn't see her." 7
The Rehabilitation Act, then, as codified, protects a broad spectrum of
persons, who fall into one of three categories: (1) persons with physical or
mental impairments that currently limit them substantially in a major life activ-
ity, (2) those with a record of this kind of impairment, (3) and those regarded
as having such an impairment.18 Congress recognized that persons "with a
record of' or "regarded as" handicapped may not currently experience a life-
limiting disability, yet they deliberately provided coverage for such persons
under the Rehabilitation Act because of the effect of unfavorable attitudes
about disability. 9 Protection from discrimination because of negative
prejudices follows Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which protects
against racial discrimination whether or not the person is actually a member of
a racial minority.2 °
In 1987, the Supreme Court explained in School Board of Nassau County,
Florida v. Arline that, when Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act in 1979, it
demonstrated as much concern for the effect of impairments on others as on the
person with an impairment.2" Supporting this observation, the Supreme Court
referred to the implementing regulations, which list "cosmetic disfigurement"
as an impairment, inferring that such an impairment would not directly limit
employment but only indirectly through its effect on others.2" The Court
explained that
[b]y amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include not only those
who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired
and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress
acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and dis-
ease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment.
23
In Arline, the Court relied on the legislative history of the Rehabilitation
Act to conclude that the Act targeted "society's accumulated myths and fears"
and "irrational fears or prejudice ' 24 about disabilities that stand in the way of
17 118 CONG. REC. 36,761 (1972). See also Frances Cooke MacGreggor, Some Psycho-
Social Problems Associated with Facial Deformities, 16 AM. Soc. REV. 629, 629-30 (1951)
(explaining that some impairments do not directly interfere with tasks of daily living, but
other people's reactions to an impaired appearance may be indirectly handicapping).
18 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2000) (stating the Act provides coverage for "any person who (i)
has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having
such an impairment").
'9 S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 38-39 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389-90.
See also Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979).
20 Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Nat'l Council on Disability, Policy Brief Series: Righting the
ADA, No. 15: The Supreme Court's Decisions Discussing the "Regarded As" Prong of the
ADA Definition of Disability (2003), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publica-
tionsl2003/regardedas.htm.
21 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 (1987).
22 Id. at 283 n.10 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (2006)).
23 Id. at 284.
24 Id. at 284 n.13 (citing Sen. Hubert Humphrey's testimony, 123 CONG. REc. 13,515
(1977)).
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full employment. Ultimately, the Court found Arline's employer liable under
the Rehabilitation Act for terminating her employment where her tuberculosis
was in remission, but the employer erroneously feared contagiousness.
Prior to the enactment of the ADA, there were few cases addressing the
duty to accommodate a "regarded as" plaintiff. Indeed, one court remarked that
opinions addressing the matter were "hen's-teeth rare."'26 Nonetheless, the
Arline decision did much to change the meaning of "disability" from an
entirely physical or medical issue into one where the full social context
matters.2 7
B. The ADA Adopts the "Regarded As" Definition
Congress borrowed heavily from the text of the Rehabilitation Act when
drafting the ADA.2 8 Wherever possible, Congress used the same "terms of art"
as in the Rehabilitation Act (as well as the 1964 Civil Rights Act), so that
businesses would have a point of reference for interpreting and implementing
the Act.29 An August 1989 Senate Committee report expressed the need for the
"regarded as" definition of disability because of concerns about discrimination
based on asymptomatic conditions that are (a) controlled by medical treatment,
(b) a medical anomaly, or (c) impairments that affect a person in appearance
but not in ability to function:
A person who is excluded from any activity covered under this Act or is otherwise
discriminated against because of a covered entity's negative attitudes towards disabil-
ity is being treated as having a disability which affects a major life activity. For
example, if a public accommodation, such as a restaurant, refused entry to a person
with cerebral palsy because of that person's physical appearance, that person would
be covered under the third prong of the definition. Similarly, if an employer refuses
to hire someone because of a fear of the "negative reactions" of others to the individ-
ual, or because of the employer's perception that the applicant had a disability which
prevented that person from working, that person would be covered under the third
prong.
30
This Senate report underscores the concern that negative attitudes, reac-
tions, and misconceptions can result in discrimination or exclusion where the
impairment itself might not prevent a person from performing or participating
fully. House Committee reports reflect the common interest in prohibiting
25 Id. at 282.
26 Cook v. R.I. Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir.
1993).
27 Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Construction of the
Meaning of Disability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA 122, 127 (Linda Hamilton Krieger
ed., 2003).
28 Ruth Colker, The ADA's Journey Through Congress, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 37
(2004).
29 Id. at 36 (quoting Rep. Steny Hoyer, a co-sponsor of the Act, 136 CONG. REC. 10,856
(1990)).
30 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989) (citing Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that under the Rehabilitation Act, an employee was not disqualified from his
job merely because an X-ray showed a congenital spine deformity because he had no actual
limitation)).
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adverse treatment on the basis of disability, regardless of whether there is a real
or current underlying impairment.3 '
In 1998, the Supreme Court observed in Bragdon v. Abbott that "[t]he
ADA's definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim from the definition of
'handicapped individual' included in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . "32
The Bragdon Court acknowledged the "particular significance" of the original
implementing regulations issued by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare,3 3 which contain the "regarded as" definition of disability.34
The ADA defines "disability" as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 35
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) implement-
ing regulations repeats this three-pronged definition of "disability"36 and, in its
interpretative guidance, outlines three ways in which one might be regarded as
disabled. First, a person may have an impairment, but it does not substantially
limit her - however her employer (or other covered entity) nonetheless per-
ceives her impairment as substantially limiting. Second, a person may have an
impairment that has become substantially limiting only as a result of others'
negative attitudes. Finally, a person may not have an impairment at all - how-
ever, her employer erroneously regards her as having a substantially limiting
impairment.3 7 Specifically, the text of the interpretive guidelines states:
There are three different ways in which an individual may satisfy the definition of
"being regarded as having a disability":
(1) The individual may have an impairment which is not substantially limiting but is
perceived by the employer or other covered entity as constituting a substantially lim-
iting impairment;
(2) The individual may have an impairment which is only substantially limiting
because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment; or
31 Burgdorf, supra note 20.
32 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). Note that in 1992, the Rehabilitation Act
was amended to substitute the word "disability" for the previously-used word "handicap."
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569 § 102, 106 Stat. 4344, 4348,
4349, 4356-58 (1992).
33 In 1979, Congress redesignated HEW as the Department of Health and Human Services
and created a new Department of Education. These changes became effective in 1980.
Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (2000).
34 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (2006).
35 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). This three-pronged definition of disability applies to all
three Titles of the ADA.
36 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2006).
37 Id. Department of Justice regulations for Titles II and III include the three ways in which
one may be "regarded as" disabled within the definitions rather than in the interpretive
guidelines. Title II guidelines are at 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(4) (2006); Title III guidelines are at
28 C.F.R. § 36.104(4) (2006).
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(3) The individual may have no impairment at all but is regarded by the employer or
other covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.
38
In these scenarios, the substantial limitation is not inherent to the person
but rather is a function of others' attitudes. In the first scenario, the person has
an impairment that does not substantially limit her in any major life activity, yet
the employer (or other covered entity) wrongly believes it does. In the second
scenario, the person's impairment alone does not substantially limit a major life
activity; however, the person is excluded (and subsequently substantially lim-
ited in a major life activity) based on others' negative attitudes about the
impairment.39 Finally, in the third scenario, the person does not have an
impairment at all, but the employer or proprietor wrongly believes she does and
that it substantially limits her in a major life activity. In these three scenarios,
the employer's or proprietor's attitudes either are mistaken about the existence
of a substantial limitation on a major life activity (the first and third scenarios)
or else actually create the substantial limitation (the second scenario).
II. THE SUPREME COURT ON "REGARDED As" DISABLED
The Supreme Court has not specifically decided the issue whether under
the ADA there is a duty to accommodate a plaintiff regarded as disabled;g0
however two opinions bear on the issue: Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S.
471 (1999) and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
The Sutton and Murphy decisions mark a qualitative change in how courts
decide whether a person has a disability that the ADA covers g.4  These deci-
sions are an important backdrop against which to consider the current state of
the law of the "regarded as" plaintiff.
A. Sutton v. United Air Lines
Karen Sutton and her twin sister Kimberly Hinton brought an action under
the ADA against United Air Lines for discrimination.4 2 The sisters wished to
38 Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630, app., 1630.2(l) (2006).
39 This scenario underscores the intent to ameliorate the affects of harmful attitudes, yet it
seems unnecessary. In the second scenario, there is substantial limitation in a major life
activity, so there is no reason to rely on the "regarded as" definition of disability. Applica-
tion of the first definition of disability does not turn on where the impairment or limitation
arose. Indeed, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999), the Supreme Court
only reported two ways in which one might be regarded as disabled - the first- and third-
listed in the interpretive guidelines.
4o Three cases decided by Courts of Appeal have petitioned to the Supreme Court for certio-
rari, and all were denied. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005) (holding there is a duty to accommodate a plaintiff
regarded as disabled); Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003) (holding there is no duty to accommodate a plaintiff regarded
as disabled); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1078 (2000) (holding there is no duty to accommodate a plaintiff regarded as disabled).
1 The Court also decided Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1998), the same
day as Sutton and Murphy. Kirkingburg did not include a "regarded as" claim. The Sutton,
Murphy, and Kirkingburg decisions are often referred to as "the Sutton trilogy."
42 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76.
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be commercial airline pilots, but because they were both severely myopic, the
airline rejected them for failure to meet vision requirements.4 3 Sutton and
Hinton claimed they were disabled under two prongs of the ADA's definition
of disability: (1) that they were disabled because of an impairment (myopia)
that substantially limited them in a major life activity and (2) that United Air
Lines regarded them as disabled.'
The Supreme Court held that the sisters were not actually substantially
limited in a major life activity because with corrective measures (glasses or
contact lenses), their vision was normal.45 The Court found that the sisters did
not meet the "regarded as" definition because they had not shown they were
substantially limited in a class of jobs - but only that they were limited in a
specific job.46
The Court stated there are two ways in which one might be "regarded as"
disabled under the ADA: "(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a per-
son has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities."4 7 Both pos-
sibilities rest on a mistake - either about the existence of a limitation or
whether it substantially limits a major life activity.48 Such mistakes result from
"society's accumulated myths and fears about disability,"4 9 and the purpose of
the ADA was specifically to combat the discriminatory effects of these errone-
ous myths and fears.5"
B. Murphy v. United Parcel Service
Vaughn Murphy had a history of high blood pressure.5 He controlled his
blood pressure with medication so that his hypertension did not generally
restrict his activities.5 2 Murphy worked as a mechanic for United Parcel Ser-
vice ("UPS"), and his job occasionally required that he drive commercial vehi-
cles.5 3 When Murphy's blood pressure tested high during a medical
examination, UPS terminated his employment because his blood pressure did
not meet Department of Transportation standards for commercial drivers.54
Murphy's action against UPS claimed he met the first and third definitions of
disability under the ADA - that his impairment substantially limited him in a
major life activity, and that UPS regarded him as disabled.5 5
43 Id.
44 Id. at 476.
45 Id. at 488-89.
46 Id. at 493.
41 Id. at 489. The Court did not explain why it does not adopt the regulatory guidelines,
which list three ways in which a person may be "regarded as" disabled under the ADA. See
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (2006).
48 Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
41 Id. at 489 (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)).
50 Id. (citing the interpretive guidelines, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., 1630.2(l)).
51 Id. at 519.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 519-20.
55 Id. at 520.
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As in Sutton, the Court found that Murphy in his mitigated (medicated)
state was only precluded from his specific job with UPS, and that he was not
substantially limited from working in a broad class of jobs.5 6 In looking at the
"regarded as" claim, the Court found that Murphy failed to show that UPS
regarded him as unable to do a broad class of jobs.57
C. "Regarded As" in the Shadow of Sutton
The Sutton and Murphy holdings require a plaintiff to show that she is
substantially limited in a major life activity even when she uses mitigating mea-
sures - or that the employer (or proprietor) regards her as disabled even after
taking into account mitigating measures. Furthermore, in an employment dis-
crimination action under both the first and third definitions of disability, a
plaintiff must show she is actually or "regarded as" being precluded from a
broad class of jobs if she is claiming "working" as a major life activity.
Sutton and Murphy marked the beginning of a judicial trend towards
restricting liability under the ADA. 58 In Arline, a 1979 case under the Rehabil-
itation Act, the Court showed great deference to regulatory standards, explain-
ing that "[i]n determining whether a particular individual is handicapped as
defined by the Act, the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health
and Human Services are of significant assistance."5 9 By contrast, in Sutton, the
Court rejected any notion of deferring to agency guidelines, saying that "the
approach adopted by the agency guidelines - that persons are to be evaluated in
their hypothetical uncorrected state - is an impermissible interpretation of the
ADA."' 60 After Sutton and Murphy, then, plaintiffs have a much higher hurdle
to clear to establish that they are disabled under the ADA. Even an amputee
might not now be able establish that she is disabled for purposes of the statute:
Under the majority's analysis [in Sutton] .... someone whose abilities exceed those
of the average person, would surely not be disabled under the ADA. For example,
neither the late Terry Fox, who for 144 days ran a marathon (26 miles) a day across
Canada on an artificial leg and inspired many other amputees to take up running, nor
Heather Mills, who runs half-marathons, snowboards, skis and skates using a pros-
thesis for half of a leg, would be disabled under the ADA.6 1
In the shadow of Sutton, with coverage under the ADA apparently shrink-
ing, could the "regarded as" prong be a "safety valve" for plaintiffs? 62 The
Sutton trilogy decisions made coverage under the ADA for someone even with
56 Id. at 520-21.
57 Id. at 525.
58 See Burgdorf, supra note 20; Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal
Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 154 (2000); Vicki J. Limas, Practitioner's Guide to the
1998 - 1990 Supreme Court Term: Of One-Legged Marathoners and Legally Blind Pilots:
Disabling the ADA on a Case-by-Case Basis, 35 TULSA L.J. 505, 505 (2000).
59 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987).
60 Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
61 Limas, supra note 58 at 535. Terry Fox was and Heather Mills is an amputee. See The
Terry Fox Foundation, About Terry Fox, http://www.terryfoxrun.org/english/about%20terry
%20fox/default.asp?s=1 (last visited Apr. 18, 2007); Heather Mills, About Heather, http://
www.heathermills.org/about.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
62 Feldblum, supra note 58, at 157.
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a severe and permanent impairment much more questionable because of the
need to overcome the "mitigating measures" hurdle.63 The "regarded as" prong
might have looked like a more attainable definition of disability for plaintiffs
because it does not require actual substantial limitation of a major life
64activity.
III. DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE A "REGARDED As" PLAINTIFF
UNDER THE ADA
A. Duty to Accommodate Generally
Satisfying at least one of the definitions of disability is a "gateway"
requirement under the ADA; 65 yet there are other elements of a discrimination
claim under the ADA. Certainly the plaintiff will first need to show that her
defendant is an entity the ADA covers.66 A plaintiff must also establish that
she is "qualified," meaning that she can perform the essential functions of the
job either with or without reasonable accommodations (for Title 1)67 or that she
meets the essential eligibility requirements for participation or services.68
Finally, she must show that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis
of her disability.6 9
Under Title I, one way an employer may discriminate is by a failure to
make reasonable accommodations:
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limita-
tions of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of
such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental
impairments of the employee or applicant .... 70
Also, under Title III, a proprietor discriminates by failing to make reason-
able modifications in the business that are necessary to allow someone to use or
otherwise take advantage of the business's services (except that fundamental
changes to the business are not required). 71 Title III states that one form of
discrimination in public accommodation is:
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when
such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can
63 Id., at 93.
6 See Michael D. Reisman, Note, Traveling "to the Farthest Reaches of the ADA, " or
Taking Aim at Employment Discrimination of Perceived Disability?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
2121, 2124-27 (2005).
65 EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2002).
66 PGA v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675-76 (2001) (stating that whether the defendant is cov-
ered under the ADA is a "threshold matter").
67 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
68 Id. § 12131.
69 Title I: Id. § 12112(a). Title II: Id. § 12132. Title III: Id. § 12182(a).
70 Id. § 12112(b)(5) (emphasis added).
71 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Spring 2007]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations ... 72
The definition of discrimination as a failure to make reasonable accommo-
dations is also part of Title. II, as the implementing regulations reflect:
A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or proce-
dures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.
73
B. The Circuit Split
Nothing in the language above distinguishes among the various definitions
of disability regarding the duty to make reasonable accommodations (or modi-
fications). Still, there is significant division among the United States Courts of
Appeal on this issue. About half of the Circuits have held as a matter of law
that there is a duty to accommodate a "regarded as" plaintiff, and the other half
have held there is no duty.74 There are four leading Circuit Court cases on duty
to accommodate a person regarded as disabled before Sutton and Murphy, and
six leading Circuit Court cases after the Supreme Court decided these cases.
As discussed infra, the increased difficulty post-Sutton of establishing disabil-
ity (given the requirement that the court should factor in mitigating circum-
stances) may have led some plaintiffs to bring their claims under a different
definitional prong - the "regarded as" prong.
The figure below summarizes the leading cases from the Circuits in chron-
ological order, with reference to the date of the Sutton and Murphy decisions.
All of the cases are Title I employment cases, and in each, the adverse job
action was termination of employment. The impairments across the cases are
varied, including physical injuries (e.g., torn cartilage), systemic disease (e.g.,
cardiovascular disease), and psychological disorders (e.g., major depression).
72 Id. (emphasis added).
73 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(7) (2006) (emphasis added).
7' For other summaries of this circuit split, see Jonathan D. Andrews, Comment, Recon-
ciling the Split: Affording Reasonable Accommodation to Employees "Regarded As" Dis-
abled Under the ADA - An Exercise in Statutory Interpretation, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 977
(2006); Matthew M. Cannon, Comment, Mending a Monumental Mountain: Resolving Two
Critical Circuit Splits Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for the Sake of Logic,
Unity, and the Mentally Disabled, 2006 BYU L. REV. 529 (2006); Jarad M. Lucan, Note,
Applying the Americans With Disabilities Act: Why Giving Traditional Reasonable Accom-
modation to "Regarded As " Disabled Individuals Brings About "Bizarre Results ", 25 QUIN-
NIPIAc L. REV. 417 (2006); Elizabeth Mills, Comment, How Bizarre? The Application of
Reasonable Accommodation to Employees "Regarded As" Disabled Under the ADA Does
Not Necessarily Lead to Bizarre Results, 75 Miss. L.J. 1063 (2006); and Kristopher J. Ring,
Note, Disabling the Split: Should Reasonable Accommodations Be Provided to "Regarded
As" Disabled Individuals Under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)?, 20 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 311 (2006).
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FIGURE 1. LEADING UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL CASES RULING ON
DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE A "REGARDED AS" PLAINTIFF.
7 5
Duty to
Case Accommodate
No Yes
Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (Ist Cir. 1996) X
Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998)76 X
Newberry v. East Texas State University, 161 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1998) 77  X
Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1999) X
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999)
Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
-1078 (2000). X
Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)78 X
Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003) X
Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department, 380 F.3d 751
(3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1725 (2005) X
Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005) X
D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (1 lth Cir. 2005) X
In general, the courts have considered three factors in deciding whether
there is a duty to accommodate a "regarded as" plaintiff: (1) the language of
the statute itself, (2) legislative intent, and (3) policy and practical
considerations.79
75 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the issue, but
declined to decide whether there is a duty to accommodate a "regarded as" plaintiff. Cigan
v. Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that "[t]he extent to
which employers' errors in appreciating the extent of their workers' real disabilities create
obligations to accommodate can be left for another day"). Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has
declined to decide the issue. Betts v.. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 145 F.App'x 7
(4th Cir. 2005) (stating that "we express no opinion on that question").
76 The Deane court did not expressly hold there was no duty to accommodate a "regarded
as" plaintiff, but it found "considerable force" in the argument. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr.,
142 F.3d at 148 n.12.
77 But see Tullos v. City of Nassau Bay, 137 F.App'x 638, 650 (5th Cir. 2005) (an
unpublished decision upholding a jury verdict because there was sufficient evidence that a
reasonable jury could have found he was disabled under the ADA, but not addressing the
issue of duty to accommodate directly).
71 The Second Circuit has not heard this issue directly. The table shows Jacques v.
DiMarzio, from the Eastern District of New York, as a de facto representative case from the
Second Circuit. Jacques was heard by the Second Circuit, but this issue was not on appeal.
Jacques v. DiMarzio, 386 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2004). The District Court opinion has been cited
by several of the Courts of Appeal.
79 Newberry and Workman held there was no duty to accommodate a "regarded as" plaintiff
under the ADA without analysis. Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.
1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d, 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998).
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1. The Language of the Statute
The first step in statutory construction is determining if the statutory lan-
guage has a "plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dis-
pute in the case." 8 ° The cases on point uniformly find that the language of the
ADA does not distinguish between duties owed to persons "regarded as" dis-
abled compared with persons who are disabled under another definition.
Looking at the plain language of the statute, the court in Jacques also
noted there is nothing in the language of the statute that differentiates "regarded
as" plaintiffs from plaintiffs disabled under other prongs.8 ' The D'Angelo
court found "no statutory basis for distinguishing among individuals who are
disabled in the actual-impairment sense and those who are disabled only in the
regarded-as sense." 82 In D'Angelo, the court compared this construction to that
in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, in which the Supreme Court refused to infer
any exemption from the duty to accommodate where the ADA was silent about
the exempting effect of neutral work rules.8 3
The district court in Jacques found that the requirement of a duty to
accommodate someone "regarded as" disabled is consistent with the mandatory
interactive process:84
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the
covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual
with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the
precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommoda-
tions that could overcome those limitations.
85
The Jacques court notes that the "vast majority" of courts have held that
the interactive process is mandatory.8 6 Once an employer knows or believes an
employee to be disabled, the employer must engage in a "good faith" interac-
tive process to determine exactly what limitations the employee experiences
and what accommodations would be appropriate.8 7 This is consistent with the
expectation that determining whether a person is disabled under the ADA is "an
individualized inquiry" and should not depend on generalities or stereotypes.8 8
When an employer has reason to believe an employee is disabled, the employer
does not know if that belief is correct until it has checked it out with the
employee herself. The EEOC has recommended that employers begin an inter-
active process any time it knows or has reason to believe there may be a disa-
bility issue for an employee, that is, whenever it:
80 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
81 Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Taylor v.
Pathmark Stores, Inc, 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999) ("the [ADA] statute does not appear
to distinguish between disabled and 'regarded as' individuals in requiring
accommodation.")).
82 D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (1lth Cir. 2005).
83 Id. at 1236 (citing U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 398 (2002)).
84 200 F. Supp. 2d at 168-69.
85 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2006).
86 200 F. Supp. 2d at 168.
87 Id. at 169 (citing the Title I interpretive guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9).
88 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 657 (1998) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
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(1) knows that the employee has a disability, (2) knows, or has reason to know, that
the employee is experiencing workplace problems because of the disability, and (3)
knows, or has reason to know, that the disability prevents the employee from request-
ing a reasonable accommodation.
89
It makes good business sense to verify that there is a problem and what it
entails before taking action.90 The Jacques court further explains that commu-
nication between the parties may function to preserve productivity and prevent
issues from developing into legal claims:
[Tihe interactive process is more of a labor tool than a legal tool, and is a prophylac-
tic means to guard against capable employees losing their jobs even if they are not
actually disabled. It is clearly a mechanism to allow for early intervention by an
employer, outside of the legal forum, for exploring reasonable accommodations for
employees who are perceived to be disabled.9 1
It also works to the benefit of the employer/proprietor to discover the
exact nature of an issue or perhaps that there is no issue at all.
Robinson v. Shell requires that the inquiry into statutory construction go
no further if "the statutory language is unambiguous and 'the statutory scheme
is coherent and consistent.' " '92 Ordinarily the court should apply the plain
meaning of a statute except for rare cases where applying the statute literally
would produce a result that is obviously at odds with the drafters' intent. 93 The
Ninth Circuit found that the plain language of the statute did not distinguish
duties owed to persons "regarded as" disabled from duties owed to others under
the ADA; however the Kaplan court declined merely to accept the plain lan-
guage because it concluded that a literal application would produce "bizarre
results."9 4 Stopping with a plain language analysis without considering the
consequences would be an inappropriate exercise in formalism - or so the
Kaplan court believed.9 5 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's holding rests more on
policy and practical considerations (discussed infra) than on its reading of the
statutory language per se.
2. Legislative Intent
Of the cases holding there is no duty to accommodate a "regarded as"
plaintiff, none rely on legislative history or intent. The courts in D'Angelo,
Jacques, and Williams - which all held there is a duty to accommodate - con-
sidered legislative intent behind the ADA as well as Supreme Court decisions
in Arline, Bragdon, and Barnett that are consistent with legislative intent.
89 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC Compliance Manual No. 915.002
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISA-
BILITIES ACT, (2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html)
[hereinafter EEOC, Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship].
90 Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc, 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
91 Id.
92 Robinson v. Shell, 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters.,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
9 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 240.
9 Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003).
15 Id. Cf Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) (explaining that "when deciding
which of two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary
consequences of its choice").
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Prior to the enactment of the ADA, Senate Report No. 101-116 endorsed a
broad duty to make reasonable accommodations under the ADA, consistent
with the intent and history of the Rehabilitation Act:
The duty to make reasonable accommodations applies to all employment decisions,
not simply hiring and promotion decisions. This duty has been included as a form of
non-discrimination on the basis of disability for almost fifteen years under section
501 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and under the nondiscrimina-
tion section of the regulations implementing section 503 of that Act.9 6
The Senate Report also states the intent that the ADA adopt the standards
and obligations under the Rehabilitation Act, specifically noting the duty to
make reasonable accommodations.97
House Report No. 101-485 referred to the Supreme Court's reasoning in
the Arline case, noting that people's attitudes and reactions to an impairment
can produce disabling effects.98 Because the intent of both the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA is to eliminate prejudice and stereotypes about disabilities,
the House Report concluded that the ADA should provide protection for per-
sons regarded as disabled:
a person who is rejected from a job because of the myths, fears and stereotypes
associated with disabilities would be covered under [the "regarded as"] test, whether
or not the employer's perception was shared by others in the field and whether or not
the person's physical or mental condition would be considered a disability under the
first or second part of the definition.
9 9
In Barnett, the Supreme Court further endorsed the notion that the design
of the ADA is to eliminate negative misperceptions about disabilities;" and in
Bragdon, it held that the ADA should provide "at least as much" protection as
the Rehabilitation Act.10 The D'Angelo court stated that imposing a duty
under the ADA to accommodate a "regarded as" plaintiff follows a "straight-
forward reading" of the statute, is consistent with the Supreme Court holding in
Arline, and is consistent with legislative intent. 10 2 Therefore, the legislative
history, as acknowledged by the courts, supports interpreting the ADA to pro-
vide coverage as broadly as the Rehabilitation Act, including protections to
persons "regarded as" disabled.
3. Policy and Practical Considerations
The cases that have held there is no duty to accommodate have relied
largely on an inference that imposing such a duty would lead to "bizarre
96 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31 (1989) (cited by D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d
1220, 1235, 1237 (11 th Cir. 2005)).
97 Id. at 2. (stating that "[t]he ADA incorporates many of the standards of discrimination set
out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the
obligation to provide reasonable accommodations unless it would result in an undue hardship
on the operation of the business").
98 H.R. REP. No. 101-486, pt. 3, at 30 (1990) (cited by Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth.
Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004)).
99 Id.
1oo US Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002).
101 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998).
102 D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2005).
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results."1 ° 3 The Kaplan court explained that imposing a duty to accommodate
someone "regarded as" disabled would lead to the "perverse and troubling"
result that people would be treated better when they were incorrectly thought to
be disabled than when they were correctly known not to be disabled.' ° Both
the Deane and Kaplan courts described this as a "windfall" to the "regarded
as" plaintiff, to whom is owed reasonable accommodation despite having either
no impairment or no substantial limitation.' °5 The Weber court implied this
would be illogical and inequitable, creating a
disparity in treatment among impaired but non-disabled employees, denying most the
right to reasonable accommodations but granting to others, because of their employ-
ers' misperceptions, a right to reasonable accommodations no more limited than
those afforded actually disabled employees.
°6
The "no duty" courts find this paradox unacceptable: under Title I, where
an employee is impaired, and her employer does not think she is disabled, her
employer may terminate her employment without ADA liability; but, if an
employee has no impairment, and the employer mistakenly thinks she is dis-
abled, then the employer would have ADA liability for terminating her
employment.
The figure below depicts the inequity that concerns the "no duty" courts:
FIGURE 2. Two "REGARDED AS" SCENARIOS CONTRASTED.
Employee is impaired + Employee is not impaired +
Employer does not think she is Employer mistakenly thinks she is
disabled = disabled =
No ADA liability ADA liability
for terminating employment for terminating employment
Were there a duty to accommodate someone "regarded as" disabled, then
the employer would bear no ADA liability regarding the impaired employee,
but would bear ADA liability regarding the employee who is not impaired.
There is an inconsistency here that if an individual is impaired and sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity, ADA liability does not depend on how
others regard her - the fact that her impairment creates a substantial limitation
in a major life activity precipitates the duty at least to consider reasonable
accommodations. However, if there is a duty to accommodate a person
"regarded as" disabled, then if an individual is not impaired (or is impaired but
not substantially limited in a major life activity), then ADA liability depends
not on any characteristics of the person herself, but only on others' beliefs.
Duty to accommodate under thefirst prong is precipitated by characteristics of
the plaintiff; duty to accommodate under the third prong is precipitated by con-
duct by the defendant.
The "no duty" courts also suggest that were there a duty to accommodate
the "regarded as" plaintiff, this would run counter to the intent of the statute
103 Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999); Kaplan v. City of N. Las
Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003).
104 323 F.3d at 1232.
105 Id.; Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998).
io6 186 F.3d at 917.
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because it would discourage people from correcting misconceptions about disa-
bilities. 11 7 Employer resources might be "wasted" on persons who were not
disabled, leaving fewer resources available for assisting those were are dis-
abled.' °8 Employees who were generally healthy would have a motive to liti-
gate or threaten litigation in order to change workplace conditions.' 9 These
predicted results are not only counter to how these courts viewed legislative
intent, but they would also be economically inefficient.
Professor Cheryl Anderson has suggested that the fear of creating a "wind-
fall" by imposing a duty to accommodate persons "regarded as" disabled may
find its roots in a belief that the ADA impermissibly creates preferential treat-
ment."' There is a popular misconception that the ADA is more about creat-
ing special advantages than eliminating discrimination, that qualifying as
disabled under the Act is like winning the lottery, and it sets one up for "a
lifelong buffet of perks, special breaks and procedural protections, a web of
entitlement that extends from cradle to grave."' Viewed this way, the ADA
is a system to be worked, because even a small disability may qualify one for
"special aid" that helps one "get ahead in life."11 2 The result is that some
judges may view ADA claimants as "supplicants" waiting for handouts."l 3 The
focus, then, becomes whether the claimant is deserving (or disabled) enough to
qualify for the "handout."" ' 4 Where the court decides the claimant is not "dis-
abled," it views her as a healthy person trying to extort privileges from her
employer. "
5
This, of course, is an erroneous conception of the Act. Persons with
claims under the ADA are not seeking preferential treatment; they are only
seeking equal access and the elimination of obstacles created by discrimina-
107 Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232.
108 Id.
'o Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12.
110 Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is "Because of the Disability" Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323 (2006).
111 Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 18.
112 Id. at 19 (see illustration by Vint Lawrence).
113 Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 49 (2000); Melanie D. Winegar, Note, Big Talk, Broken Promises:
How Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Failed Disabled Workers, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1267, 1304 (2006).
114 Winegar, supra note 113, at 1316.
115 Anderson, supra note 110, at 365. Here, Prof. Anderson cites Deane v. Pocono Medical
Center. 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998). In Deane, the Third Circuit predicted that
the effect of imposing a duty to accommodate the "regarded as" claimant would be to
permit healthy employees to, through litigation (or the threat of litigation) demand changes in
their work environments under the guise of "reasonable accommodations" for disabilities based
upon misperceptions; and (2) create a windfall for legitimate "regarded as" disabled employees
who, after disabusing their employers of their misperceptions, would nonetheless be entitled to
accommodations that their similarly situated co-workers are not, for admittedly non-disabling
conditions.
Deane, 142 F.3d, at 148 n.12. See also Lucan, supra note 74, at 452 (characterizing persons
not "disabled" under ADA criteria as "able-bodied" and that guaranteeing reasonable accom-
modations to persons "regarded as" disabled would create "unfair advantages").
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tion.1 6 This is what the ADA, as a piece of civil rights legislation, is about." 7
The proper focus, then, is on the wrongful conduct of the defendant and how
that conduct impermissibly excludes or discriminates against the plaintiff.'18
By contrast, the courts finding there is a duty to accommodate the
"regarded as" plaintiff generally find that any "bizarre" or paradoxical results
would likely be anomalous. In any case, even if these results are unusual, these
courts do not attempt to second-guess congressional intent:
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course con-
sciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a
statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality
determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of
review, nor are we vested with the power of veto .... In our constitutional system
the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt
congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with "common sense and
the public weal."' 19
The "duty" courts are not troubled by the contrasted scenarios depicted in
Figure 2, supra. These courts emphasize the fact that in these scenarios, liabil-
ity follows attitudes (or prejudice). Whereas the "no duty" courts focus on the
fact that the person who is not impaired results in liability to the employer, they
ignore the fact that the "non-impaired" person suffers from being not only
regarded as disabled, but also incorrectly regarded as well. The Kelly court
articulated it this way:
We fail to understand the point, for it is in the nature of any "regarded as disabled"
claim that an employee who seeks protections not accorded to one who is impaired
but not regarded as disabled does so because of the additional component -
"regarded as" disabled. This rationale provides no basis for denying Validity to a
reasonable accommodation claim.
120
The scenarios are not equivalent. The language, legislative intent, and
policy underlying the ADA all seek to prevent just the sort of unearned nega-
tive treatment the "regarded as" plaintiff experiences. 12 1
Without a duty to accommodate, the employee who is perceived accu-
rately keeps her job, but the inaccurately perceived employee may have her
employment terminated without the employer incurring any liability.
122
Imposing a duty towards the person "regarded as" disabled does not create a
116 Anderson, supra note 110, at 372.
117 Diller, supra note 113, at 3 1-3 " Winegar, supra note 113, at 1303. But see Anderson,
supra note 110, at 340 (noting that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not generally
require employers to make reasonable accommodations except for some cases where relig-
ious discrimination is at issue). Anderson further describes reasonable accommodation as "a
form of affirmative action, whose validity under statutes like Title VII continues to be hotly
debated." Id. at 381. However, in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Supreme Court, although
acknowledging that "accommodation" is a form of preferential treatment, explained that
such individualized modifications were completely "necessary to achieve the Act's basic
equal opportunity goal." 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002).
118 Diller, supra note 113, at 31; Winegar, supra note 113, at 1303, 1316.
"9 D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1238 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (citing Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978) (superseded by statute)).
120 Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
121 Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996).
122 Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2004).
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"windfall," but rather corrects an inequity. 123 It also creates a motive for all
parties to eliminate misconceptions about impairments and disabilities.124 Fur-
thermore, employers who cling to stereotypes and prejudices run the risk of
seeing limitations that have no factual basis. The Act should hold them respon-
sible for their own biased and faulty perceptions by imposing a duty to accom-
modate the persons whom they regard as disabled.125
Instead of focusing on possible bizarre results, the courts might have
invoked the "mischief rule," looking to the ills the ADA was intended to
cure. 126 Rather than looking prospectively and entirely hypothetically, the
"mischief rule" would have the court look to the "mischief and defect" that the
statute was designed to eradicate. 127 This is essentially what the "duty" courts
did, looking to the House and Senate Committee reports' documentation of the
disabling effects of pernicious stereotypes, in addition to the Supreme Court's
analysis in Arline.
128
The "no duty" courts have referred to "regarded as" plaintiffs as "non-
disabled."1 29 In characterizing the "regarded as" claimant as not disabled, the
courts may be confusing the ordinary, lay meaning of "disabled" with the spe-
cific, legal definition under the Act. 3 0 However, one may be "disabled" under
the ADA in three different ways, and being "regarded as" disabled is one of
those ways. Therefore, the "regarded as" plaintiff is disabled within the mean-
ing of the ADA.' 3 ' Imposing a duty to accommodate the person regarded as
disabled cures the mischief.
123 Id.
124 Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676.
125 Cannon, supra note 74, at 562. Cannon also suggests that where courts fail to read the
ADA to impose a duty to accommodate persons "regarded as" disabled, the effect may be
especially harsh on persons with mental illness. Id. at 531. Even persons with an actual
mental illness impairment will generally base their claims of discrimination on employer
perceptions. Id.
126 See Elliott Coal Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp., 17 F.3d 616, 631 (3d
Cir. 1994) (citing Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584)).
127 Id.
128 Cf Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 894-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
Gelfo was a case under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act in which the court
applied reasoning from cases under the ADA to determine whether there was a duty to
accommodate a "regarded as" disability clairnant under the state statute. Id. The court con-
cluded that "[t]o further the societal goal of eliminating discrimination, the statute must be
liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and provide individuals with disabilities the
greatest protections," which included imposing a duty to accommodate the "regarded as"
claimaint. Id. In this sense, presumably a "liberal" construction means that which yields the
greatest protection.
However, from a strictly textualist point of view - which is often regarded as politically
conservative - the ADA makes no distinction in the duties owed to persons under the three
definitions (prongs) of disability. See Thomas N. Abbott, Comment, Kaplan and "Regarded
As": Does the ADA Discriminate Between Real and Perceived Disability?, 39 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 883, 898 (2006).
129 See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 97 (8th Cir. 1999).
130 Abbott, supra note 128, at 903-04, 906.
131 D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1239 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE: APPLYING REASONABLENESS + THE UNDUE
HARDSHIP DEFENSE
The "no duty" courts predict that if there were a duty to accommodate a
person "regarded as" disabled, the results would be bizarre, perverse, and
troubling.' 3 2 These courts foreshorten the analysis by eliminating the duty
altogether rather than permitting the duty to lie, and then letting the evidence
show whether bizarre situations result. An alternative approach would be to
impose the duty to accommodate the "regarded as" plaintiff, but then to utilize
the "reasonableness" requirement inherent in the ADA to dismiss claims that
might be bizarre. Furthermore, even if a plaintiff establishes that the accommo-
dations she requests are reasonable, the employer (or proprietor) may offer the
defense of undue hardship.
Some have argued that the only way to settle the circuit split is for the
Supreme Court to decide the issue. 13 3 Another suggestion is that "regarded as"
plaintiffs under the ADA should be allowed more latitude in establishing their
prima facie case - allowing them to introduce evidence of pretext at that point
rather than waiting until the employer has rebutted the prima facie case.
134
This Note argues that other features of the ADA are available to prevent
"bizarre results" or inequities from imposing a duty to accommodate the
"regarded as" person: the reasonableness requirement and the undue hardship
defense. There is no need for courts to "effectively rewrit[e] and veto[ ] a por-
tion of the ADA"'135 by eliminating wholesale the duty to accommodate this
category of claimant.
A. The Reasonableness Requirement
All three Titles to the ADA have a reasonableness requirement, and the
Act requires no employer or proprietor to do anything unreasonable. 136 To
make a prima facie case, a plaintiff need only show that the accommodation she
requests is reasonable on its face. 137 At a minimum, this might mean that the
plaintiff shows that it is at least feasible or plausible for the employer/proprietor
to make the accommodation.'
38
In order to show reasonableness, the plaintiff needs to establish that the
accommodations she requests are effective and that the costs of the accommo-
dation are not out of line with the associated CoStS. 13 9 The requirement essen-
tially poses two questions: (1) will the accommodation allow the plaintiff to do
132 See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003).
133 Andrews, supra note 74, at 1001; Cannon, supra note 74, at 531.
134 Jennifer Schechter Sharret, Note, Refining the Production Burden for "Regarded As Dis-
abled" Claimants, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 994 (2006). Although this approach may have
some merit for the true "regarded as" plaintiff, it could have the unwanted effect of encour-
aging nonmeritorious claims under the "regarded as" prong in order to gain a more favorable
burden of proof structure.
131 Mills, supra note 74, at 1082.
136 Title I: 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (2000); Title II: 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000);
Title III: 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
137 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002).
138 Id. at 402.
139 Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995).
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her job (or to use the public accommodations)?; and (2) are the costs of the
accommodation generally in line with the benefits it would achieve? t4 ° These
requirements are not generally onerous, and a plaintiff would only likely risk
summary judgment for the defendant where she requested accommodations that
were either "clearly ineffective or outlandishly costly." ''
B. The Undue Hardship Defense
Where the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of reasonableness, the
burden shifts to the defendant, who may defend by showing that the requested
accommodation would place an undue hardship or burden on the entity.'
42
Under the statute, undue hardship is generally an economic matter, weigh-
ing the costs and benefits of the requested accommodation. The ADA lists
several factors that will aid in determining undue hardship, including the cost
of the accommodation, the financial resources of the defendant, the size and
nature of the business operation, and administrative or organizational
circumstances. 1
43
Invocation of the undue hardship defense is liberal, allowing an employer/
proprietor to make a case-by-case analysis.l 44 Undue hardship is specific to the
circumstances so that the same accommodation might be an undue hardship for
one employer but not for another - or it might be an undue hardship for an
employer under one set of circumstances, but would not be for that employer
under different circumstances. 145 Congress appears to have considered the
140 Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
141 Borkowski v. Valley Ctr. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1995).
142 Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543. Under Vande Zande, the plaintiff must prove reasonable-
ness, implying that the plaintiff has the burden of proof on that issue. Id. However, some
courts hold only that the plaintiff has the burden of production on reasonableness, at which
point the burden of nonpersuasion shifts to the defendant to show undue hardship. Borkow-
ski, 63 F.3d at 138.
143 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000). The statute defines undue hardship as follows:
(A) In general. The term "undue hardship" means an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B).
(B) Factors to be considered. In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include-
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the
reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on
expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation
of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a
covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location
of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition,
structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity.
'44 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2006). But see J. H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA
L. REV. 903, 907 (2003) (describing the duty to accommodate under the ADA as "distinc-
tively demanding").
145 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d).
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need for a flexible standard for undue hardship and intended to create
allowances for varying economic or business conditions.' 4 6
For the most part, an employer may demonstrate undue hardship by a cost/
benefit analysis, showing that the costs of the accommodation are dispropor-
tionate to the benefits it might achieve.' 4 7 However, undue hardship need not
be entirely economic: undue hardship may result from the imposition of exces-
sive administrative difficulty,' 4 8 a change in the fundamental nature of the bus-
iness, 149 a determination that the accommodation is not necessary for the
person requesting it,15 or an unfair disruption in employees' expectations of
benefits or work rules. 15 1
Consequently, there is no need to eliminate the duty to accommodate a
"regarded as" plaintiff on the basis of predicted "bizarre" results when the law
provides for a way to test whether the results would be unreasonable or inap-
propriate. Where court decisions truncate the analysis before examining
whether employer/proprietors' actions are actually discriminatory, they do little
to advance the intended goal of the ADA: eliminating discrimination about
disabilities.' 52 Each time a court narrows a definition or duty under the ADA,
it picks meat off the bones of the Act, so that the intended beneficiaries are left
with little more than a bare carcass.
C. Picking the Appropriate Accommodation
"Accommodation" is a general term and refers to "any change in the work
environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individ-
ual with a disability to enjoy equal .. .opportunit[y]."' 53 The implementing
regulations define reasonable accommodation as:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified
applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant
desires; or
(ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or cir-
cumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that
enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of
that position; or
(iii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a
disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its
other similarly situated employees without disabilities.
154
146 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 41 (1990) ("By including a number of factors the
Committee intends to establish a flexible approach.").
147 Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 138-39.
148 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987).
141 Id.; PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 n.38 (2001).
'50 Martin, 532 U.S. at 683 n.38.
"I' US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404-05 (2002).
152 Reisman, supra note 64, at 2149-50.
153 EEOC, Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship, supra note 89.
154 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i)-(iii) (2006).
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Examples of reasonable accommodations include job restructuring, policy
or training modifications, interpreters or other communications aids, or changes
to physical facilities that make them accessible. 155
To be effective, the parties should tailor the accommodation to the individ-
ual and the job or service requirements.156 An accommodation for a person
"regarded as" disabled might be different from what is typical. Under the first
prong, an accommodation might primarily involve changes to matters external
to both parties - changes in things, procedures, or policies. Under the third
prong, an accommodation might primarily involve a change to the defendant
himself - a change in attitudes or beliefs.
The core problem for the "regarded as" plaintiff is the mistaken beliefs or
attitudes by the employer/proprietor.' 57 Logically, then, that would be the
place to start in determining what the appropriate accommodation would be.
Examples of accommodations that might be appropriate where the central
"impairment" is actually other people's beliefs might include training for co-
workers or supervisors and "creative marketing plan[s]" focused on changing
customers' expectations or stereotypes.1 58 Reasonable and appropriate accom-
modations should target the various kinds of attitudinal barriers anticipated by
the Act: social discomfort at being in the presence of a disabled person, inac-
curate and stigmatizing beliefs, and inflated fears of disabled persons posing a
higher degree of risk.159
Where the target of the Act is at least in part the elimination of pernicious
"myths and stereotypes," the accommodation should focus on them. The par-
ties should not assume that the only correction needed is the employer/proprie-
tor's attitude adjustment; rather, the parties should utilize the interactive
process to correct misunderstandings and communicate their respective
needs.' 60 However, where the ADA contemplates that an accommodation
might involve "any change in the work environment,"1 61 this should include
attitudinal changes as well as policy or operational changes. 162
D. Alternative Theories of Recovery
Plaintiffs in jurisdictions that do not allow a duty to accommodate a per-
son "regarded as" disabled may still have viable causes of action under other
theories.
155 Id. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i-ii).
156 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990) ("A reasonable accommodation should be
tailored to the needs of the individual and the requirements of the job.").
"' See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
158 Michael D. Moberly, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: The Employer's Duty to Accommo-
date Perceived Disabilities, 30 ARiz. ST. L.J. 603, 638 (1998).
159 Linda Hamilton Krieger, Sociolegal Backlash, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA, supra
note 27, at 376.
"6 Cf Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
161 Equal Employment Opportunities for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726,
35,744 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2006)).
162 Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair
Advantage" Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REv. 901, 1001 (2000).
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1. Adverse Employment Action
Under Title I, a "regarded as" plaintiff may skip over the duty to accom-
modate and proceed directly with a claim of discrimination if she has exper-
ienced an adverse employment action. The ADA provides that
[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.
163
Provided the plaintiff can show that disability was a factor in the adverse
employment action, she may be able to succeed in her claim."6
2. Hostile Work Environment
Claims and remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act are also avail-
able under the ADA. 165 Where negative attitudes based on disability are so
severe and pervasive that they alter working conditions, a Title VII plaintiff
may be able to make a claim for hostile work environment.' 6 6 By extension,
this same claim is available to a plaintiff covered under the ADA. 167
Under Title VII, a hostile work environment claim is predicated on the
fact that such an environment affects the "terms, conditions, [and] privileges of
employment."' 68 Congress included these same terms in the ADA, 169 which
provides a parallel basis for a hostile work environment claim based on disabil-
ity discrimination.' 70
Although it may be difficult to prove hostile work environment because it
has a high evidentiary bar,'' in theory is it a logical alternative tool for the
"regarded as" plaintiff.
3. Summary
Applying the reasonableness requirement and using the interactive process
to determine the appropriate accommodation are two features of the ADA that
163 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
16 Id. § 2000e-2(m). See also Tullos v. City of Nassau Bay, 137 F.App'x 638 (S.D. Tex.
2005) (affirming a jury verdict in the district court for a "regarded as" plaintiff whose
employment was terminated due to misconceptions about his abilities and limitations).
165 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000).
"6 Cf. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (holding that a claim for
sexual harassment would be actionable where it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment'").
167 Lanman v. Johnson County, Kan., 393 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2004).
168 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
....").
169 Id. § 12112(a).
170 Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2003). See also Flowers v. S.
Reg'l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247
F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
171 Mannie v. Potter, 394 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that for a "regarded as" plaintiff
to show hostile work environment the hostility must be so severe as to be abusive as judged
both objectively and subjectively).
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should prevent "bizarre" results without having to resort to nullifying the duty
to accommodate the "regarded as" plaintiff. Letting the claim go further in the
litigation (or mediation) process may appear more costly in the short run; but if
it eliminates barriers to full employment and participation, it will be not only
more just but more productive for all parties in the long run. Furthermore, it
provides some protection for employers (or proprietors) by restricting the duty
to accommodate where it is reasonable and produces no undue hardship on the
business.
The Supreme Court need not decide this issue because the elements of the
solution are already available within the text of the ADA. This solution
employs the whole of the ADA, not merely the definitions of "disabled." It
would not require Congress to amend or revise the Act. If the courts recog-
nized the duty to accommodate persons "regarded as" disabled, and properly
limited accommodations by applying the reasonableness requirement and
undue hardship defense, then the answer to the question, "Is there a duty to
accommodate persons 'regarded as' disabled under the ADA?" would no
longer depend on geography.
CONCLUSION
As he signed the ADA into law in 1990, President George H. W. Bush
described the occasion as a "splendid scene of hope." '72 Fifteen years later,
Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta recalled the "bright promise" of
the enactment and recounted the many instances of progress in the intervening
years. 1
73
Despite a common perception of extraordinary progress, in fact, claims
under the ADA rarely succeed: defendants prevail an astonishing 93% of the
time at trial on the merits and in 84% of the reported appeals cases.' 7 4 This
important piece of civil rights legislation, though broad in its initial conception,
has yielded narrow gains for persons with disabilities. 7 5
It has been over thirty years since the Rehabilitation Act was enacted,
which first sought to eliminate the "myths and stereotypes" about disability.
Although many consider the ADA to have been very effective in eliminating
disability-based discrimination, others see the work that remains to be done and
substantial discrimination that yet remains. 176
Legislative intent and statutory language both confirm that the design of
the ADA was that it be an extension of the Rehabilitation Act. Yet the courts
are still at odds over the fundamental question of the duty to accommodate
under the "regarded as" definition of disability. Some fear that "many, perhaps
most, courts are not enforcing the law, but instead are finding incredibly inven-
172 Pres. G. H. W. Bush, supra note 6.
173 Norman Mineta, U.S. Secretary of Transportation, Remarks at the ADA 15th Anniver-
sary Symposium (July 26, 2005), available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/minetasp072605.
htm.
Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1999).
175 Susan Gluck Mezey, DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT IN FEDERAL COURT 166 (2005).
176 Id. at 4.
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tive means of interpreting the ADA to achieve the opposite result that the Act
was intended to achieve."' 177 The fear of "bizarre" results keeps some courts
from imposing such a duty, even though the ADA has other features that ensure
that only reasonable duties are imposed. If the courts referred to the ADA as a
whole - mindful of the underlying purpose of the Act - they would be able to
see these built-in protections and would find it unnecessary to eliminate the
duty to accommodate.
177 Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA 's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights
Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 338 (2001).
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